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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HARLEN ELISA RODRIGUEZ-CHAVEZ; 
A. A. R.-C., 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                                                          
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A202-128-945, A202-128-946) 
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 4, 2021 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Harlen Rodriguez-Chavez and her minor child A. A. R.-C. petition for review of a 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the order of the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Rodriguez-Chavez’s applications for asylum and 
withholding of removal.1  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.     
I 
Rodriguez-Chavez is a native and citizen of El Salvador.  She entered the United 
States without admission or parole in October 2014.  The Department of Homeland 
Security issued her a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court, charging her with 
removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  Rodriguez-Chavez appeared and 
conceded removability.   
Rodriguez-Chavez filed applications for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 and 
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  In her asylum application, she 
stated that she feared the Mara 18 gang would harm her because her father witnessed a 
gang murder.  At her hearing, she testified that she feared gang retaliation for the legal 
work her brother provided in El Salvador and that the police could not protect her from 
 
1 Rodriguez-Chavez listed A. A. R.-C. as a derivative beneficiary on her asylum 
application.  Because their asylum claims rise and fall together, we refer only to 
Rodriguez-Chavez in this opinion.  Derivative beneficiary status, however, does not exist 
for withholding of removal, so A. A. R.-C. is ineligible for relief on that basis.  See 
Warui v. Holder, 577 F.3d 55, 58 (1st Cir. 2009); Matter of A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 
279 (B.I.A. 2007). 
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the gangs.2  As relevant to this appeal, she also asserted that she would be persecuted 
because she is a member of a purported particular social group (“PSG”): “persons 
perceived to have contravened gang rules.”3  A.R. 196.  Additionally, she argued that she 
would face persecution for a political opinion, namely her opposition to gang rule.       
The IJ denied Rodriguez-Chavez’s applications for asylum and withholding of 
removal and ordered her removal.  The IJ found Rodriguez-Chavez’s testimony to be 
credible, but concluded that she was not entitled to relief because: (1) she had not 
presented evidence of past persecution in El Salvador; (2) she could not establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution based on her status as a person “perceived as 
contravening gang rules” because this “amorphous” category does not constitute a PSG, 
A.R. 59; and (3) her political opinion claim failed since (a) there was insufficient 
evidence that “the gang structure in El Salvador is, in essence, a political force that 
dominates life in El Salvador,” and (b) “refusal of gang wishes is not an expression of 
political points of view such that persecution for them constitutes a political persecution,” 
A.R. 61-62.  Because Rodriguez-Chavez could not meet the lower standard for asylum, 
 
2 Rodriguez-Chavez’s brother also testified that gangs may retaliate against 
Rodriguez-Chavez due to his criminal defense work in El Salvador.   
3 Before the IJ, Rodriguez-Chavez argued that she belonged to two other PSGs but 
she has not challenged the conclusion that these groups, namely (1) women who cannot 
leave an abusive relationship, and (2) family members of someone who witnessed a gang 
crime, are not PSGs so any arguments regarding those PSGs are thus waived.  United 
States v. Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2003).   
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the IJ found that her claim for withholding of removal also failed.  Rodriguez-Chavez 
appealed to the BIA.     
The BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion and dismissed the appeal.  The BIA determined 
that: (1) “persons perceived to have contravened gang rules” is not a cognizable PSG 
because it is “amorphous” and Rodriguez-Chavez “presented insufficient evidence to 
show that Salvadoran society perceives, considers, or recognizes such individuals as 
being treated any differently than any other person opposing the purposes of the gang,”  
and (2) her political opinion claim failed because she did not “establish that the gangs 
would target her based on her belief that her opposition to the gang was a political 
opinion.”  A.R. 3.  As a result, the BIA found that Rodriguez-Chavez was not entitled to 
asylum or withholding of removal.     
 Rodriguez-Chavez petitions for review. 
II4 
An alien who enters the United States without permission is removable.  See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A).  A removable alien may be eligible for 
 
4 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction 
over final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 
F.3d 496, 502 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).     
Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts portions of the IJ opinion, we review 
both the IJ and BIA decisions.  See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543-44 (3d Cir. 
2018).  We review legal determinations de novo and “accept factual findings if supported 
by substantial evidence,” meaning we must “uphold the agency’s determination unless 
the evidence would compel any reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.”  Sesay 
v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).   
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asylum if she demonstrates that she is “unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail [herself] . . . of the protection of, [the country to which she would be 
removed] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . . 
membership in a [PSG] . . . or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).  We first address Rodriguez-Chavez’s PSG claim and then turn to her 
political opinion claim.     
A 
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s finding that “persons perceived 
to have contravened gang rules” is not a cognizable PSG.  A.R. 3; Pet’r Br. at 3.  A PSG 
must be: “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, 
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”  
S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Particularity “addresses the outer limits of a group’s boundaries and is 
definitional in nature, whereas social distinction focuses on whether the people of a given 
society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct.”  Id. at 548 
(quotation marks omitted).  To satisfy the particularity requirement, “an alleged social 
group [must] have discrete and . . . definable boundaries that are not amorphous, 
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective, so as to provide a clear standard for determining who is 
a member.”  Id.  (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
Rodriguez-Chavez’s proposed PSG lacks social visibility and definable 
boundaries.  First, the concept of “contravening gang rules” is vague.  For example, it is 
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unclear whether “contravening gang rules” means only active contravention, such as 
defying curfews, requests for bribes, or recruitment efforts, or if it also captures more 
passive opposition to gang activity, of which the gang itself may not even be aware.  
Second, there is no evidence that Salvadoran society would recognize those who 
contravene gang rules as socially distinct or different from others who oppose gangs.  
Third, a similar and more specific group than that which Rodriguez-Chavez proposes—
those targeted for resisting gang recruitment—is not recognized as a cognizable PSG 
because such a group is neither particular nor socially distinct.  See Santos-Ponce v. 
Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “minors who oppose gang 
membership” is not “sufficiently particular or socially distinct”); Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 
795 F.3d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 2015) (concluding that proposed group of individuals 
opposed to gang membership lacked particularity because “[a] group consisting of all 
Guatemalan citizens who do not sport gang colors and tattoos is by definition too 
amorphous and overbroad to be particular”); Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 
991-93 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that proposed group of “El Salvadoran males threatened 
and actively recruited by gangs, who resist joining because they oppose the gangs” lacked 
social distinction); see also Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 589 (2d Cir. 2021) 
(concluding that “former gang members who renounce their gang membership,” “former 
gang members who actively oppose gangs,” and “persons who (regardless of former gang 
association) work to help youths resist gang membership” in El Salvador do not satisfy 
the particularity or social distinction elements).  Accordingly, Rodriguez-Chavez has 
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failed to demonstrate that her proposed PSG is particular or socially distinct.  Thus, her 
alleged fear of persecution based upon membership in such a group does not provide a 
basis for asylum. 
B 
 To qualify for asylum based on a political opinion, a petitioner must demonstrate 
that she has faced or will face persecution because of that opinion.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); see also Ndayshimiye 
v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] key task for any asylum applicant 
is to show a sufficient ‘nexus’ between persecution and one of the listed protected 
grounds.”).  Even assuming Rodriguez-Chavez’s views about gangs constitute a political 
opinion, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that she “did not meet her 
burden to establish that the gangs would target her based on . . . her opposition to the 
gang.”  A.R. 3.  She has not shown that the gang was aware of her opinion or that the 
gang would persecute her because of that opinion.  As a result, her political opinion claim 
fails.5  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting asylum claim where there was “no evidence that [petitioner’s] refusal to join 
 
5 Indeed, Rodriguez-Chavez does not contest this no-nexus finding, arguing 
instead that the IJ erred by requiring that the potential persecutor “must be a government, 
or that the applicant must have a political opinion regarding a formal government.”  Pet’r 
Br. at 30.  We need not address this argument because, even assuming that the 
Salvadoran gangs constitute a government for asylum purposes, Rodriguez-Chavez has 
failed to establish the requisite nexus between her political opinion and the threat of 
future persecution by those gangs.   
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was taken by the gang as an expression of [a] political opinion” and concluding that 
“refusal . . . based on an internally held political opinion . . . cannot support a claim that 
he was persecuted on account of that political opinion”).6 
III 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
6 Because Rodriguez-Chavez’s asylum claims fail, she is also not entitled to 
withholding of removal, which carries a higher standard of proof.  See Blanco v. Att’y 
Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2020).   
